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Foreword 
A typical feature of many decision problems is the uncertainty about possible conse- 
quences. By uncertainty we mean here that there are several possible consequences and 
that, moreover, there is not much information about their relative likeliness of occurrence. 
The present paper is devoted to situations with extreme uncertainities, which occur fre- 
quently with environmental policy problems. The authors revise and refine an existing 
approach in order to  make it more realistic. They demonstrate the capabilities of the ap- 
proach by applying it to policy evaluation for decreasing the emission of carbon dioxide. 
The reported research is part of IIASA's project Methodology of Decision Analysis. 
Abstract 
I n  this paper we propose a new methodology of decision analysis under ex- 
treme uncertainties which could analyze the preference of various type of 
persons from pessimistic ones  to optimistic ones. For this purpose w e  revise 
a previous axiom of dominance for  constructing a measurable value function 
(utility function) under uncertainty based o n  Dempster-Shafer  theory of 
probability . The  previous axiom of dominance has dealt  with only the best 
and the worst results in  the set element. Here, we propose a new axiom of 
dominance after defining the value of the set element taking into account the 
average of the value of al l  the results included in the set element. It is  shown 
that we can construct a measurable value function under uncertainty for  a 
pessimistic, a n  ordinary o r  a n  optimistic person, based o n  this new axiom of 
dominance. An  example of evaluating the alternative policies to decrease the 
emission of carbon dioxide for avoiding global warming i s  included. 
Keywords:  Decis ion  ana lys i s ;  E x t r e m e  uncer ta in ty ;  Demps te r -Shafe r  
theory ; Dominance; Environmental engineering; Global warming 
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1.  Introduction 
Progress of science and technology and rapid economic development have 
increased welfare of humankind enormously. Rapid economic development, 
however, has introduced large-scale energy consumption and the rapid in- 
crease of greenhouse gas, especially carbon dioxide emission. Environmen- 
tal risk of global warming has thus increased a s  the result of greehouse gas 
effect. W e  need to develop systems methodology to  predict such negative 
effect under extreme uncertainties and to  make decision on  selecting a n  ap- 
propriate countermeasure. 
Expected utility theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) has 
been a powerful tool for  decision making under risk, where probability of 
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been a powerful tool for  decision making under risk, where probability of 
getting each consequence is  given. In real situations there exist many cases 
where probability of getting each consequence i s  unknown. For these cases, 
we need a methodology for  decision making under uncertainty. 
Dempster-S hafer theory of probability (S  hafer 1976) i s  a powerful tool 
to cope with such uncertainties. For constructing a value function under un- 
certainty based on Dempster-Shafer theory of probability, only the best con- 
sequence and the worst consequence in  the set element have been used in  the 
previous axiom of dominance (Jaffray 1988). When there exist more than o r  
equal to  three elements in  a set element, the values of the elements except the 
best one  and the worst one a re  disregarded when w e  evaluate the set element. 
In this paper a new axiom of dominance is proposed in which all the 
elements in the set element will be used to  judge the value of the set element. 
It will be shown how this new axiom of dominance i s  used to construct a 
value function under uncertainty. It is  assumed that the probability of occur- 
ring each element i s  unknown, instead, the basic probability for  each set ele- 
ment i s  given. 
Using the methodology described in  this paper we  will try to  evaluate 
alternative policies to decrease the emission of carbon dioxide which i s  
closely related with global warming. 
2. Value Function under Uncertainty Based on Dempster-Shafer 
Theory of Probability 
Let the value function under uncertainty based on the basic probability of 
Dempster-Shafer be 
f * (B, P )  = w' ( V ) V  * ( B  I ~ 1 )  (1)  
where B denotes a set element, ,M denotes basic probability, w' denotes a 
weighting function for  basic probability, and v* denotes a value function 
with respect to  a set element. Set element B is  a subset of A=2@, where O 
contains all the elements. 
Equa t ion  (1 )  i s  a n  ex t ended  vers ion  o f  va lue  func t ion  based  o n  
based on Bayes probability theory can be found in Tamura et a1.(1987). 
Axiom of Dominance 1: In the set element B let the worst consequence be 
m, and the best consequence be ME. For any B , .  B ,  E A = ~ ~  if 
m ~ ,  2 m 4 ,  M B ,  2 M B 2  hen  B, zB2 
LC 77 
where aAh  denotes h  is preferred to or indifferent to a. 
Using this Axiom of Dominance 1, we will restrict a set element B to 
Q= { ( r n , M ) € 8 x 8 : m  + M )  
where m and M denote the worst and the best consequence in the set element 
B, respectively. Then, eqn.(l) is reduced to 
f * ( a p ) = w 1 ( p ) v * ( ~ ~  p ) .  (2) 
Suppose we look at an index of pessimism a(m ,M)  such that the follow- 
ing two a1 ternatives are indifferent: 
Alternative 1: One can receive m for the worst case and M for the best case. 
There exists no other information. 
Alternative 2: One receives m with probability a(m,M) and receives M with 
probability 1 - a(m,M), where O<a(m,M)<l. 
If one is quite pessimistic,a(m,M) becomes nearly equal to 1, and if he 
is quite optimistic a(m,M) becomes nearly equal to zero. If we incorporate 
pessimism index a(m,M) in eqn.(2), value function is obtained as 
v * ( Q  l p ) =  v * ( ( m , M )  I p )  
= n(m.  M ) v ' ( m  I ,u) + { I  - a ( m ,  M)}v ' (M I ,u). 
3. Deficiency in the Previous Models 
The value function based on Dempster-Shafer theory of probability can 
handle a set element in which multiple elements are included. However, we 
could easily raise contradicting examples when we follow Axiom of Domi- 
nance I .  
Urn a Urn b 
Figure 1. Urns in Example 1 
Example 1: Suppose there exist two urns, u and bas shown in  Fig. 1. Urn a 
contains 30 balls of black, yellow and green, however, the number of balls 
with each color is unknown. Urn b contains 30 balls of white. red and green. 
The number of balls with each color is again unknown. Suppose a decision 
maker (DM) selects urn u or urn b and he will pick up a ball from the urn he 
selected. He will receive the following amount of money in Japanese yen 
depending upon the color of ball he picks up. 
Black: 1000, Yellow: 5000, Green: 6000, 
White: 2000, Red: 3000 
Let a,. a,. a, be the events of picking up black ball. yellow ball and 
oreen ball, respectively, from urn u, and let a set element B, be b 
B, = {al.az.a3) (4) 
Let b,, b,. - b, be the events of picking up white ball. red ball and green ball. 
respectively. from urn b, and let a set element B, be 
= {bl.b2, b,) . (5) 
Let v(a,) and v(b.) be monetary value of each element for i=1,2,3. If we fol- 
low Axiom of Dominance 1 
a (b,ispreferredtoa,) (64  
a, -b, (a, is indifferent to b,) (6b) 
Then, we will get 
B, 4 B2 
However, the monetary value of B ,  and B, are 
This leads to B, + B? ,  which is contradicting with eqn.(7). 
4. A Revised Axiom of Dominance 
Axiom of Dominance 2: Let m, and MI be the worst and the best conse- 
quences. respectively. in the set element B,,  and m, and M, be the worst and 
the best consequences, respectively, in the set element B,. Let g ,  and g, be 
hypothetical elements such that 
where 
n,: number of elements in B, 
n,: - number of elements in B,. 
If 
~ n ,  4 m,, MI 5 M 2 ,  g, zgz 
CV 
then 
BLAB2 
Using Axiom of Dominance 2, we could restrict a set element B to 
a= { ( m . g . ~ ) ~ € 3 x  ex e: m i g +  M}.  
Then, eqn.( l )  is reduced to eqn.(2), and furthermore 
f * (a, s l )  = f * ( (m,  g. M). s 1 )  
= ~f(msl)+Rf(g.sl)+hf(~.~) (9) 
~ ~ + ~ s , + a = l  
wherep,, p2, & denote weighting coefficients for the worst element, for the 
hypothetical element such that its value is the average of all the elements, 
and for the best element, respectively. 
If we follow Axiom of Dominance 2, B, and B, in Example 1 cannot be 
compared, since 
Example 2: Suppose there exist two urns a and b as  shown in Fig. 2. Urn a 
contains 30 balls of black, yellow and green, however, the number of balls 
with each color is  unknown. Urn b contains 30 balls of white, blue and 
oreen. The number of balls with each color is  again unknown. Suppose a DM b 
selects urn a or urn b and will pick up a ball from the urn he selected. De- 
pending upon the color of ball he picks up, he will receive the following 
amount of money: 
Black: 1000, Yellow: 5000, Green: 6000, 
Urn a Urn b 
Black 
@@ 8
Figure 2. Urns in Example 2 
White: 2000, Blue: 4000 
As shown like in Example 1, let 
B, = {a1 (black), at ().ellow), a, (%reen)} ( 1 Oa? 
B, = {b, (white), b,(blue), b,(green)} ( lob)  
An ordinary conservative person prefers B, to B,. A value function for such 
person should be convex. e.g. 
In this case 
which leads to 
and 
m,(= a , )  4 m, (= b, )  
g, + g2 
M, (= a,) -- M ,  (= b, ) 
This example shows that Axiom of Dominance 2 can describe the preference 
of ordinary conservative person. 
5. Relaxation of Dominance 
Axiom of Dominance 2 i s  more restricted than Axiom of Dominance 1. 
Axiom of Dominance 2 can handle a conservative or pessimistic preference, 
but not suitable for the other type of preference, e.g. risk prone or  optimistic 
preference. In Example 2, it depends on the type of DM'S preference whether 
he would prefer urn a or urn b. Pessimistic DM may prefer urn b to urn a, and 
optimistic DM may prefer urn a to urn b. We need a new Axiom of Domi- 
nance which could represent such preference correctly. 
Definition 1: Let a set B contain n elements as  
and let v(a.)  be value of each element. Let 
and let ol(m,M) be the index of pessimism which has been defined in Axiom 
of Dominance 1. Suppose h is  a value function of a set element B such that 
h ( B  I a )  = a + he-Ca(mM' , if v(g)  * { v ( ~ )  + v(m))  f 2  ( 1 6 4  
h ( B  I a)  = a + ba(rn,M), if v ( g )  = { v ( ~ ) +  v (m)) f  2  ( 16b) 
where parameters a, b, c are  determined by 
h(B 1 O )  = v(M),  h(B I 0.5) = dg) ,  
h ( B  1 1 )  = d m )  
Axiom of Dominance 3: If 
II(B,  I a )  5 h ( ~ ~  I a)  
then 
4 $4. 
Using Axiom of Dominance 3, eqn. ( l )  is  reduced to 
f * (II(B I a), p )  = w'(p) ldB I a ) .  (17) 
Using Axiom of Dominance 3, let us look at Example 2 again in the follow- 
ing Example 3. 
Example 3: For pessimistic person (say a=0.8) if we use e q n . ( l l ) ,  we get 
eqns.( l2)  and (13). W e  then obtain 
h(& I a ) = 1 . 5 4 - 0 S ~ 2 . 8 6 " ~  =0.29 ( 18a) 
h(B, I a)  = 3.25- 2 . 2 5 ~  1.24'' = 0.58. ( l a b )  
This  implies that such pessimistic person prefers B,  to  B,. 
For optimistic person (say 01=0.2) if we use a value function 
we obtain 
which lead to 
2 ( a )  3 = 0 . 5  , 2 r(bi) 13 = 0.47 . 
We then obtain 
h(& I a )  =3 .02-2 .02~  1.50~' = 0.83 
h ( ~ ~  I a )  = -1.81 +2.81 x 0 . 6 6 ~ ~  = 0.78. (22 b) 
This implies that such optimistic person prefers B, to B,. 
As shown in this Example 3, Axiom of Dominance 3 proposed in this 
paper could represent the preference of both pessimistic person and optimis- 
tic person, properly. 
6. Global Warming and Evaluation of Various Alternative Policies to 
Decrease Carbon Dioxide Emission 
Recent increase of carbon dioxide concentration around the globe is serious 
and i t  is said that the resulting global warming may cause serious damages in 
our life. Therefore, we need to restrict the emission of carbon dioxide some- 
how. 
Suppose we look at three alternatives as follows: 
Alternative a: Amount of carbon dioxide emission is reduced to 1990 level 
by the year 2000. 
Alternative b: Amount of carbon dioxide emission is not increased any 
more. 
Alternative c: No restriction is imposed on carbon dioxide emission. 
The damage considered here is just the damage caused by unusual 
weather. Let us consider a two-attribute problem of cost to realize each alter- 
native and the damage caused by unusual weather. 
Table 1 :  Alternatives, cost, and damage 
caused by unusual weather 
Suppose cost to realize alternative a, b, c are x,, x,, x, (x,>x,>x,=O), re- 
spectively, and probability of getting damage caused by unusual weather are 
p , ,  p,, p, (p,<p,<p,) where p,  denotes a Bayesian probability. p, and p, de- 
note basic probability used in Dempster-Shafer theory. 
Let us define three events as follows: 
d l :  Get damage caused by unusual weather due to global warming. 
d,: Get damage caused by unusual weather which is not related with global 
warming. 
d,: No damage. 
Three alternatives are summarized in Table 1 .  In Table 1, for alternative 
u, p,  denotes probability of getting damage caused by unusual weather based 
on 
the meteorological data obtained up to 1990, and 1- p ,  denotes probability of 
not getting any damage. For alternative b, probability of getting damage 
caused by unusual weather will be increased, but i t  will be fuzzy. Basic prob- 
ability p, is assigned to the set element of {d , ,  d,}. Actually, when we get 
damage caused by unusual weather, we do not know whether it is due to 
global warming or not. Basic probability 1- [ r ,  is assigned to the set element 
composed by all the elements {d, .  d,. d,}. For alternative c. basic probability 
p, and 1- p, are assigned similarly. 
By using value function under uncertainty, we evaluate three alterna- 
A'ternative 
n 
b 
C 
Cost 
X 2  
X 3  
Damage Caused by 
Unusual Weather 
{ d , )  P 1 
. ( dJ  1 - Y ,  
{ d l ,  d , )  pz 
{ d l ,  d,, 4 )  1-p,  
{ d l ,  d 2 )  p3 
3 9 d 3  1 - P ,  
tives a, 6, c. Since our  problem is with two attributes, value functions can be 
described as  
~*!a)=f*(~l.{d2}.fi)+f*(~l.{~3}~~-fi) (23a) 
F * ( b ) =  f  * ( ~ ~ . { d ~ . d ~ } , ~ ~ ) + f  * ( ~ . { d l . d ~ . d 3 } . 1  - p 2 )  (23b) 
F * ( c ) =  f  * ( ~ ~ . { d ~ . d ~ } . ~ )  + f  * ( x 3 . { d l . d 2 . d 3 } . 1 - p 3 ) .  ( 2 3 ~ )  
Let v,(x.) be value function for  cost, v,(d) be value function for  getting 
damage caused by unusual weather, h(Bla) be value function for  set element, 
w(*) be value function (weighting function) for  probability of getting dam- 
age, k ,  and k,  be scaling coefficients for  cost and for  getting damage caused 
by unusual weat her, respectively. Then eqn.(23) i s  reduced to  
F * ( a )  = k l w ( ~ l ) v l ( x l )  + k2n(fi  )v2(d2)  +klw(l - rn)v~(x l )  + k z w ( l - ~ l ) ~ 2 ( d 3 )  (24a) 
F * ( b )  = k,w(rr2)v,(x2) + k 2 ~ ( ~ 2 ) 4 { d l . d 2  1 I a) +k1w(l- f i h ( x 2 )  
+k,w(l - p,)h({d,. d , .  d3}  l a )  (24b) 
F*(c)=kl~(,~3)v1(~3)+k2n(113)h({dl*d2} I a )  +k1w(1-u3)v1 (x3)  
+k,w(l- u3)h( {d l .d2 ,d3}  I a )  ( 2 4 ~ )  
Let 
& I )  = 0,  w ( ~ 2 )  = 0.3 w(p3)  = 1, w ( p )  = 1 for p r p3 
vZ(d1) = 1. ~2(d3)' 0  
where  each  va lue  s h o w s  disuti l i ty,  that  i s ,  h igher  va lue  impl ies  high 
disutility. The interpretation for  these values i s  a s  follows: 
Concerned with cost, the value for  the least cost i s  set t o  0, the value for  
the highest cost i s  set to  1, and the value for  keeping the present status i s  set 
to  0.3. Concerned with probability, the value for  the best case i s  set to  0, the 
value for  keeping the present status i s  set to 0.3, and the value for  probability 
higher than or  equal t o  p, i s  set to  1. 
In this case eqn.(24) i s  reduced to  
~ * ( a ) = k , x O x l + k ,  ~ o ~ v ~ ( ~ ~ ) + ~ ~ x I x ~ + ~ ~ x ~ x o  
= kl 
F * ( b )  = k, ~ 0 . 3 ~  0  + k2 ~ 0 . 3 ~  h( {d , .d , }  I a)  
= 0.39k, + k2(03h({dl.d2} I n)+h( {d , . d2 ,  d 3 }  I a)]  
= k2{h({d,.d2} l a)+ h({dl .d2 ,h}  I a)}  
Let 
v t (d2)  = 0.1 . 
Since disutility of getting damage by unusual weather which is not related 
with global warming, is not so high. 
Using pessimism index, disutility for set element is obtained as 
h({d, .d2} I a )  = a(dl .d2)?(dl)  + (1 - a(d l .  dr))v2(dr) 
= 0.9a(d1, d , )  + 0.1 (26a) 
h({d, ,d, .  d3} I a)  = -0.53 +0.53x 2.89a (26b) 
Using eqn.(26), eqn.(25) is reduced to 
F *(a)  = k, (274 
F * ( b )  = ().3')k1 + k2 F.27a(d1,  d , )  + 0.03 + / ({dl .  d , ,  d3} I a)}  V7b) 
It will be shown that eqn.(27) can represent the preference of pessimis- 
tic person, ordinary person and oplimislic person, where each type of person 
is described as follows: 
Pessimistic Person: Global warming is quite serious, progress of global 
warming is irreversible, and once warming has started, i t  will never be re- 
covered. (a =0.8) 
Ordinary person: Global warming is serious. the increase of temperature 
might be few degrees centigrade by the middle of 21st century. (a =0.5) 
Optimistic Person: Global warming is within meteorological change, or it 
could be solved by the progress of science and technology. ( a  =0.2) 
Pessimistic Person: Let 
a(d , .  d t )  = a(d l .  d3 )  = 0.8 
then 
h({dl .d2 .  d3}  1 0.8) = 0.71. 
Equation (27) is then reduced to 
F * ( a )  = k, 
F  * (b )  = 039k, + 0.96k2 
F * ( c )  = 1.53k2. 
Ordinary person: Let 
a(d l ,  d z )  = a(d, ,  d 3 )  = 0.5 
then 
h({dl .d2 .  d3}  1 0.5) = 0.37 
Equation (27) is then reduced to 
~ * ( a )  = k, 
F  * (b )  = 039k1 + 0.5-tk2 
F*(C)= 0.92k2 
Optimistic Person: Let 
a(dl ,  d 2 )  = a(d, ,  d3 ) = 0.2 
then 
b({d , .dr .d3}  10.2) = 0.13. 
Equation (27) is then reduced to 
F * ( a )  = k, 
F *(b)  = 0.39kl + 0.2 lkz 
F * ( c ) =  0.41kz. 
Table 2 shows the value of disutility obtained for various values of scal- 
ing coefficients k ,  and k,. In this table bold number shows the value for the 
best alternative among alternatives a, b, c. For the same value of scaling 
coefficient, pessimistic person chooses alternative a which is the most strict 
alternative for carbon dioxide emission. On the contrary optimistic person 
tends to choose alternative c which is the most loose alternative. That is, the 
value function under uncertainty proposed in this paper can properly repre- 
sent the preference of pessimistic person, ordinary person, and optimistic 
person. 
Table 2: Evaluated Values of Alternatives for 
Various Scaling Coefficients. 
7. Conclusion 
In  this paper a new axiom of dominance for constructing a value function 
under uncertainty based on Dempster-Shafer theory is proposed. Since all 
the elements in  a set element are used to evaluate the set element, we ob- 
tained the mean value of the values of all the elements in the set element. 
Then, i t  is postulated that an ordinary person evaluates the value of a set 
element by this mean value, a pessimistic person evaluates the value of a set 
element lower than the mean value, and an optimistic person evaluates the 
value of a set element higher than the mean value. 
Using this hypothesis a new axiom of dominance is proposed. I t  could 
enable us to evaluate a set element by using the best element, the worst ele- 
ment, pessimism index and the mean value of the values of all the elements 
in the set element. Based on the value of a set element evaluated through this 
axiom of dominance, a value fuiiction under uncertainty is constructed to 
evaluate various alternatives. 
Using the methodology proposed in this paper various alternatives to 
restrict the emission of carbon dioxide are evaluated. In general, when we 
come across unusual weather, we do not know whether it is due to the in- 
crease of carbon dioxide or not. Using Dempster-Shafer theory we assigned 
basic probability to a set element which contains multiple elements such as 
"unusual weather is due to the increase of carbon dioxide," and "unusual 
weather is not due to the increase of carbon dioxide." The value function 
constructed based on this problem formulation could properly evaluate the 
preference of various type of persons, ordinary, pessimistic or optimistic 
ones. 
Since the value function under uncertainty could be reduced to the pros- 
pect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Jackson and Sarin 1989) or ex- 
pected utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947) under specified 
conditions, i t  is possible to incorporate Dempster-Shafer theory to these 
theories. 
For further research 
1) we need to investigate a method to find and assign basic probability to 
each set element, 
2) instead of using arithmetic mean we need to t ry  to use geometric mean or 
other averaging operator for evaluating the value of a set element. 
This research was supported in part by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Re- 
search on Priority Area of "The Human-Earth System" under grant No. 
05278233 and 06271 242. 
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